“The Determination of Paternity Must be Admissible”. Post-Unification Civil Law Theory and Practice and the Family Law Reforms. Transitory Law Issues by Valsecchi, Chiara
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 1 (2015), n. 13, pag. 1-17. 
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria@irlh.unimi.it 1 
 
 
 
 
 
“THE DETERMINATION OF PATERNITY MUST BE ADMISSIBLE”.  
POST-UNIFICATION CIVIL LAW THEORY AND PRACTICE  
AND THE FAMILY LAW REFORMS. TRANSITORY LAW ISSUES 
 
Chiara Valsecchi 
Università degli Studi di Padova 
valsecchi@giuri.unipd.it 
 
 
Abstract: The rule set in the Italian civil code of 1865 forbidding 
investigation about paternity out of wedlock was deeply innovative in 
comparison with judiciary practices in the Middle and Modern ages, as well 
as in comparison with early-XIX-century, pre-Unity legislation on the 
matter. 
The rule raised therefore a wide debate in doctrine, with a strongly 
engaged field of civil lawyers demanding a reform of the code; however, it 
was also the occasion of a florid casuistry, with special regard the solution 
of problems in the application of transitory rules. The situation in the 
territories formerly belonging to the Lombardo-Veneto was particularly 
complex, given thay they had been subjected to the quite different rules 
provided by the Austrian ABGB. 
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The almost absolute ban on inquiries on natural paternity, which the 
unification Civil Code of 1865 had borrowed from the French1, was defined 
by Giuseppe Pisanelli as “a safeguard for the stability and decorum of 
families”2. Even the Senate Commission responsible for the revision of the 
draft Civil Code, considered it a “legal [principle] common” to the civilised 
peoples3. But it was also harshly criticised. Many proposals were put 
forward to have it amended, both during the preparatory works as well as 
during the years following the entry into force of the Code4. 
Indeed, despite the affirmations made by the law’s redactors, the 
choice had not been unequivocal. Always with its eye on comparison, legal 
doctrine had noted that obtaining legislative systems around the world 
were divided in two or three classes, depending on whether the natural 
child had the right freely to look for the father, whether that right was 
completely banned, or whether the search was allowed only in certain 
cases5. 
____________________ 
1 Art. 189 of the 1865 Civil Code lays down: “Scrutiny as to paternity is forbidden, except in 
the case of rape, when the period of such rape shall refer to that of conception” (cfr. 
Article 340 of the Code Napoléon). 
2 Cfr. Relazione sul Progetto del primo libro del Codice Civile presentato in iniziativa al 
Senato dal Ministro Guardasigilli (Pisanelli) nella tornata del 15 novembre 1862, in S. 
Gianzana (ed.), Codice civile  preceduto dalle Relazioni Ministeriale e Senatoriale, dalle 
Discussioni Parlamentari e dai Verbali della Commissione coordinatrice, I, Relazioni, Turin 
1887, p. 28.  
3Relazione della Commissione del Senato sul Progetto del Codice Civile presentato dal 
Ministro Guardasigilli (Pisanelli) nelle tornate del 15 luglio e 26 novembre 1863, in 
Gianzana (ed.),  Codice civile , I, Relazioni  [nt. 1], p. 210.  
4 The matter has already been studied, in particular by the historiography dealing with 
social and women issues in addition to that dealing with law. An essential bibliography can 
be found in the Note at the end. To keep to the limits of this essay, the following recent 
titles can be cited by way of example: B. Montesi, Questo figlio a chi lo do?: minori, 
famiglie, istituzioni (1865-1914), Milan 2007, particularly pp. 97 – 103; G. Galeotti, In cerca 
del padre. Storia dell’identità paterna in età contemporanea, Rome-Bari 2009, particularly 
pp. 57-87, in which the ban on the inquiries relating to paternity is considered as the 
logical consequence of the principle whereby “father is only he who decides to be such”. 
The author’s chapter is therefore entitled “Paternity as punishment”. 
5 G. Leoni, under Filiazione, in Digesto Italiano, 11.2, Turin 1892-1898, pp. 207-301 (253). A 
wide scansion of the legislations of Europe, America and elsewhere is found also in C. F.  
Gabba,  La dichiarazione della paternità illegittima e l’articolo 189 del Codice civile italiano, 
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As a consequence, many were those in Italy who proposed new rules 
which allowed, at least in certain cases, the possibility to ascertain 
paternity judicially. This line, already espoused by the Roman Rota, had 
been recently followed by some pre-Unification states, and the imitation of 
the French example met with strong opposition frequently based on claims 
of autonomy and of the marked superiority of the Italian legal tradition 
with respect to the model on the other side of the Alps. 
Then the Coordinating Commission, entrusted with the fine-tuning of 
the Civil Code, decided to follow the example of the Kingdom of Savoy. 
During its meeting of April 27, 1865, a comfortable majority of its members 
decided to introduce an exemption to the ban in the case of “a written 
document signed by the person indicated as father of the child”, expressly 
recalling the rule found in the Albertine Code6.  
The addition does not however appear in the final text. At 
promulgation stage, Minister Vacca clarified that there had been “a serious 
discussion” on this point. He himself considered the proposed change 
worthy of study, and acknowledged that many favoured it. But he then 
admitted that “We do not dare follow this new path”, so as not to trespass 
the limits of the delegated power. The Minister’s proposal to listen to 
public opinion and to carry out “new inquiries and new studies” on the 
matter in order then to present them to Parliament7, was accepted with 
regard to the first aspect, but not with regard to possible legislative 
outcomes. 
Between the 1860s and the 1890s, the legal publications with the 
widest circulation frequently carried opinions requesting a reform of the 
Code.  
For instance, writing in the “Archivio Giuridico”, Emilio Bianchi, on the 
basis of his first-hand knowledge and experience, proposed previous 
____________________ 
in “Annuario delle scienze giuridiche, sociali e politiche” 1881, pp. 178-240, in particular 
pp. 190 et seq., and in V. Mori, Appunti su l’azione di paternità naturale nel diritto antico e 
moderno, in “Il Filangieri” (1890), pp. 569-584, 594-631, 622-708.   
6Verbali della Commissione di coordinamento, procès-verbal no. 12 – Sitting of April 27, 
1865, in S. Gianzana (ed.),  Codice civile [nt. 1], III, Verbali, Turin 1887, pp. 93-94. 
7Codice civile del regno d’Italia, Turin 1866, pp. XIII et seq.. The text has been republished 
also in A. Aquarone, L'unificazione legislativa e i codici del 1865, Milan 1960, pp. 370-371. 
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Tuscan case law8 as model, even suggesting the introduction of a “prudent 
and moderate use of the inquiries on paternity”9. 
In the prestigious “Filangieri”, Vittorio Mori devoted an in-depth 
historical and comparative study to the natural paternity action, in which 
he proposed that the obtaining Italian law be reformed to allow at least 
some exceptions to the ban10. 
“Circolo giuridico” and “Antologia giuridica”11, both published in Sicily, 
“Foro italiano”12, “La Legge”13 and others14, all carried numerous essays 
and commentaries on judicial decisions dealing with this subject. 
____________________ 
8 The Tuscan Courts constantly allowed the paternity action in the case of the so-called 
“ad ventrem custody” (that is to say in the case of more uxorio cohabitation, when the 
“civil status” of the woman and her honest behaviour subsist, and when the man exercises  
a “jealous oversight”) and in the case of the awareness and opinion openly shown by the 
presumed father, that is to say when he openly showed to consider himself the father, not 
only with words but also by “deeds expressing the sentiment of paternal duties and 
affection in such a way as to establish a corresponding opinion in neighbours and 
acquaintances”. E. Bianchi, Le indagini sulla paternità naturale, in “Archivio giuridico”, 24 
(1880), pp. 162-183, citations at pp. 173-174.  
9 Bianchi, Le indagini [n. 8], p. 178. The same periodical carries an essay on the subject 
penned by Torquato Cuturi. This author too favoured a reform of the Code (T. Cuturi, Studi 
sulla dichiarazione giudiziale della paternità dei figli naturali, in “Archivio giuridico” 24 
(1880), pp. 385-426). Cuturi came back to this point in his review of a French monograph 
(T. Cuturi, Di una recente pubblicazione degli avv. Paul Coulet ed Albert Vaunois (Étude sur 
la recherche de la paternité, avec une preface de Renault, Paris, Marescqainé), 1880, in 
“Archivio giuridico” 26 (1882), pp.186-196. He took up the subject again in another piece 
(vide infra, n. 44). 
10  Mori, Appunti su l’azione di paternità naturale  in “Il Filangieri” (1890), [nt. 5]: most 
importantly the conclusions at pp. 620 et seq. 
11 On the first, for instance, see V. Tuzzolino, Dei diritti della prole illegittima e delle 
indagini sulla paternità, in “Il Circolo giuridico” 1881; on the second, among others, B. 
Brugi, La riforma della nostra legislazione civile, in “Antologia giuridica” 3, issue 3-4 (Feb-
Mar 1889), pp. 295-296;  I. Santangelo Spoto, I nati fuori matrimonio e la proibizione di 
ricerca della paternità, in “Antologia giuridica” 3, issue 9-12 (Aug-Nov1889), pp. 186-211; 
as well as G. Leonardi-Mercurio, La seduzione e l’art. 189 del cod. civ. ital., in “Antologia 
giuridica” 4, issue 8-12 (Dec. 1890-Apr 1891), pp. 690-727. Opinions in the opposite 
direction were also expressed: P. Delogu, Codice privato e codice sociale, in “Antologia 
giuridica” 5, issue 1 (May 1891), pp. 5-28 (cfr. G. Speciale, Antologia Giuridica. Laboratori e 
rifondazioni di fine Ottocento, Milano 2001, pp. 61 et seq. This book is also useful for a 
comprehensive evaluation of the Catania periodical, as well as the parallel Palermitan 
“Circolo Giuridico”). 
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Although divided on both political position and several aspects of 
their legal thinking, a liberal such as Carlo Francesco Gabba15 and a socialist 
such as Enrico Cimbali16, as well as many others17, agreed on this point. 
Despite the numerous nuances, therefore, many authoritative voices 
proffered various hypotheses in which the proof of paternity, though 
always very difficult, could be deemed reasonably certain. 
____________________ 
12 See F. Ferrucci, Nota to the Court of Cassation fo Turin, decided on 16 December 
1879, in  “Foro italiano” 1880, I,  p. 298; Id., Intorno alle indagini sulla paternità 
promosse da uno straniero davanti i tribunali italiani,  in “Foro italiano” 1882, I,  p. 31; P. 
Casini, Dell’indizio nascente dalla rassomiglianza fra il supposto padre ed il supposto figlio nelle 
indagini sulla paternità, in “Foro italiano” 1887,  I,  p. 296; F. S. Gargiulo, Azione e prova della 
paternità naturale nei casi di sequestro di persona, ratto o stupro violento, in “Foro italiano” 
1887, I,  p. 693. 
13 Especially relevant is the essay penned by E. Precerutti, Si debbono ammettere le 
indagini sulla paternità?, in “La legge” 5 (1865), I, pp. 567 et seq. 
14 By way of example one may cite the contribution made by Domenico Giuriati in 
“Temi veneta”  (D. Giuriati, Il divieto delle indagini sulla paternità, in “Temi veneta” 
1881, p. 1641); the two contributions made by Pasquale Nasca carried by the 
Neapolitan periodical “Diritto e giurisprudenza in materia civile, penale, commerciale 
ed amministrativa” (P. Nasca, Dell’abrogazione dell’art. 189 contenente il divieto delle 
indagini sulla paternità, in “Diritto e giurisprudenza” 6 (1890), p. 205 e Id., Se e quali 
riforme sieno  da introdursi nel codice civ. relativamente alla ricerca della paternità ed 
alla condizione giuridica dei figli illegittimi, in “Diritto e giurisprudenza” 7 (1891), p. 
158, who answers, like many other jurists, the question posed by the Third Nationa l 
Law Conference, about which see immediately infra). Many other essays are 
enumerated in Leone’s ample bibliography under Filiazione, [n. 3], pp. 208-211, to 
which the reader is referred for the sake of brevity. 
15 Gabba,  La dichiarazione della paternità illegittima [n. 5], in particular  pp. 222 et seq.  
16 His views on matters of family law are aired in some essays of the 1880s, gathered in a 
volume called, not casually, Due riforme urgenti: il divorzio e la ricerca della paternità 
naturale, Turin, 1902, published posthumously (the author had passed away in 1887) on 
the occasion of a new debate of these two themes. 
17 In favour of the reform one finds, for example, the widely-cited essay penned by 
Tommaso Traina, Il riconoscimento e la legittimazione dei figli naturali secondo il diritto 
civile, Turin 1883; as well as C. Cavagnari, Nuovi orizzonti del diritto civile in rapporto colle 
istituzioni pupillari. Saggio di critica e riforma legislativa, Milan 1891, pp. 21 et seq. and U. 
Sorani, Della ricerca della paternità, Florence 1892; for the opposing views see E. Masè 
Dari, Un’accusa infondata al divieto della indagine sulla paternità, Turin 1891. For other 
examples, refer again to Leoni, under Filiazione, [n. 3], pp. 208-211.  
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The Third National Law Conference (Florence, September 1891) 
discussed this subject during its Civil Law session18. It almost unanimously 
proposed the abolition of the ban, affirming the opposite principle 
whereby “the search for paternity has to be allowed”, not only in the cases 
of abduction and rape, but also when “paternity transpired indirectly from 
a civil or criminal judicial decision which has become res judicata, or 
depends on a marriage which was declared null … or else transpires from a 
written, explicit declaration of the father”19. The search had also to be 
allowed in the case of the seduction of the woman, more uxorio 
cohabitation, and lastly, “if the father treats the child paternally in an 
unequivocal manner”20. 
The strong determination to return to the ius commune legal position 
is here abundantly clear. 
But the opinion of those Italian civil lawyers favouring the 
amendment of art. 189 was also swayed by the practical problems of the 
long and complex transition from Restoration law to Unification law. 
In particular, the passage to the Kingdom of Italy of the territories 
which had previously been under Austrian rule, called for a legislative 
intervention, expressly to regulate the case of inquiries on paternity. Art. 7 
of the Royal Decree of 30 November 1865 no. 2606 for Lombardy and art. 6 
of the transitory provisions of 25 June 1871 for Veneto declared the 
inapplicability of the bans contained in Articles 189, 190 and 193 of the 
new Code to citizens born or conceived in those regions before the Code’s 
entry into force21. 
____________________ 
18 The Conference, subdivided according to four themes (civil law and civil procedure, and 
two on criminal procedure) took place over one week. The first civil law thesis dealt with 
“if and which reforms are to be introduced in the Civil Code relating to the search for 
paternity, and the condition of illegitimate children” (Atti del III Congresso Giuridico 
Nazionale tenutosi in Firenze l’anno 1891 pubblicati per incarico della Commissione 
esecutiva dall’Avv. Camillo de Benedetti, direttore della “Cassazione Unica”, Turin 1897, 
pp. 13, 23-24, 32-51, 210-236). 
19 The Italian legislator had already paid attention to these cases. In terms of Article 193 of 
the Civil Code, in such circumstances, the natural child could file a suit for alimony, even if 
acknowledgement was forbidden and investigations on maternity excluded. 
20Ibidem, pp. 221-222.  
21 The choice, after all, followed perfectly the line established also in the case of preceding 
legislative transitions, before and during unification. For instance, when the Albertine 
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These still fell under the regime of the Habsburg Civil Code, which 
held sway in Lombardy-Veneto from 1816, in particular §§. 163 et seq. of 
the A.B.G.B. which allowed with a certain latitude the judicial action for the 
ascertainment of paternity. 
However, the difference between the Austrian and Unification 
regimes with regard to the judicial effects of natural paternity, whether 
spontaneously acknowledged or judicially pronounced, was significant. On 
account of this, the application of transitory provisions became difficult. 
Court cases and theoretical approaches varied to considerable degrees, 
and authors debated them openly, at times even lambasting them. 
The Lombard Courts had been faced with this problem already since 
the 1860s. Soon after, the Venetian Courts found themselves having to 
face it too. But not even certain rulings of the Courts of Cassation of 
Florence and Turin were enough to do away with all the lingering doubts. 
The fundamental norm, thus, was §. 163 of the Austrian Code, 
according to which  
“only he who, in the manner provided for in the Regulation of Civil 
Procedure, shall prove having engaged in amorous congress with the 
mother of the issue in the period of time which, reckoned till the delivery, 
shall not be less than six months and not more than ten months, and 
equally only he who admits to this also extra-judicially, shall be presumed 
to have generated the issue”. 
As observed by the more eminent commentators of the A. B. G. B., 
this norm was a clear choice to grant children the highest degree of 
protection. It not only paved the way to the proof of paternity through all 
possible means contemplated generally by Austrian civil procedure. It also 
added the simple extra-judicial admission, made to whomsoever. 
____________________ 
Code was promulgated, Article 3 of the Patents Royal of 6 December 1837; or the act 
whereby the Piedmontese Civil Code was extended to the Romagne on 26 November 
1860; and so on. Curiously enough, Amilcare Della Carlina  expressed a contrary opinion to 
this legislative solution on the Milanese “Monitore dei Tribunali”. He aired his views in the 
last phase of the preparatory works of the Unification Civil Code. In his view, the strong 
reasons adopted by the Minister to justify the ban on inquiries suggested the applicability 
of the new law “also to children generated under the previous regime, which did not 
contemplate a similar ban” ([A. Della Carlina], Diritto transitorio, I. Questione intorno 
all’indagine della paternità naturale, in “Monitore dei Tribunali” 1865, pp. 362-365). 
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According to §. 166 of the Regulation of Civil Procedure, such admission 
would usually have probative value only if made to somebody who has 
interest in knowing the truth22.  
Furthermore, in the light of the ratio attributed to the legislative text, 
the case law of the first half of the 19th century had held that admitting to 
being the father of an illegitimate child and admitting to having “engaged 
in amorous congress with the mother” were the one and same thing, and 
had even considered it a valid proof if the admission was made by a youth 
who was still a minor23. 
To balance out the evident bias in favour of the offspring, Austrian 
civil law gave the possibility to the defendant always to provide the proof 
to the contrary24. In addition, there was also the rule found in §. 165, which 
excluded all illegitimate children from the enjoyment of family rights, 
including the use of the father’s surname25. 
These were allowed only to demand from the parents, alimony, 
“education and placement according to the parents’ means”26. 
The evident disharmony between the Austrian and the 1865 Italian 
legislations, as we have already seen, gave rise to a significant debate. 
The most relevant issue which both authors and Courts had to deal with 
was whether the judicial declaration of paternity, obtained through a suit 
lodged after 1865, or after 1871, on the basis of the transitory provision, “was 
equivalent to legal acknowledgement done under the new law”27. 
____________________ 
22 Cfr. on this point, for example, the unambiguous observations made by J. Mattei, I 
paragrafi del codice civile austriaco avvicinati dalle leggi romane, francesi e sarde, Venice 
1852, p. 502 along with the bibliography referred to therein. The A.B.G.B. was also 
eulogised by Cavagnari, Nuovi orizzonti [n.17], pp. 32 et seq. 
23 Mattei refers in particular to certain rulings of the 1840s (Mattei, I paragrafi [n. 22], p. 502). 
24 Doctrine insisted clearly on this, even clarifying that § 163 provides for merely simple 
presumption (ibidem). 
25 §. 165 of the A.B.G.B.: “illegitimate children shall not enjoy all family and kinship rights; 
they shall not lay claim to the family name of the father, or to his noble title, or to his 
heraldic device, or to any other prerogative of parents, but shall only take the family name 
of the mother”. 
26 Così il § 166 che si concludeva precisando che gli illegittimi non sono “propriamente soggetti 
alla patria potestà di chi li ha generati, ma sono assistiti e rappresentati da un tutore”. 
27 The matter was widely discussed, with the endorsement of a length bibliography, by 
Leoni under Filiazione [n. 3], pp. 263-275. 
CHIARA VALSECCHI 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 1 (2015), n. 13, pag. 1-17. 
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria@irlh.unimi.it 9 
It would seem that at first, practitioners and professors agreed on the 
limitation of the effects of the rule. They held that that legislator’s 
objective had simply been to preserve acquired rights. Like the Court of 
Appeal of Milan, they decided that 
“the judicially-made declaration of natural filiation in proceedings 
lodged in Lombardy in terms of Article 7 of the transitory provisions on the 
application of the Civil Code, does not grant the natural offspring but the 
benefits given him by the discontinued Austrian legislation, certainly not 
the decidedly more significant rights granted by Italian legislation in the 
case of natural filiation, whether acknowledged or judicially declared”28. 
Confusion, however, started to reign from the 1870s onward, on 
account of certain rulings of the Lombard courts. 
The same Milanese Court of Appeal was the first to distance itself 
from its own previous decisions, allowing a natural offspring (even if thus 
declared in terms of Article 7 of the transitory provisions) to carry the 
paternal surname29. It also ordered to enrol the birth in the civil status 
registry30 as provided for by the new Code, but precluded by Austrian law. 
The way was thus paved for an interpretation favourable to the 
offspring. According to these decisions, Article 7 not only kept alive the 
former law, giving rights to the search for one’s paternity, but also gave the 
declaration of paternity thus obtained the same effects of a formal 
acknowledgement on the basis of Article 192 of the 1865 Civil Code. The 
judicially-declared offspring thus had personal, family and even successory 
____________________ 
28 Court of Appeal of Milan, decision of 14 November 1867, confirming the decision of first 
instance delivered on 7 January of the same year. The maxim is found in “Monitore dei 
Tribunali” 1869, p. 195. At the same time, the Court of Appeal of Brescia followed the 
same line in a decision of 6 February 1869, also published by “Monitore dei Tribunali” 
1869, pp. 195-196. The two rulings were followed by a long editorial note which openly 
contested the interpretation and embraces the more child-friendly approach, which at 
first was not appreciated by the greater part of civil lawyers but was later accepted by the 
Lombard courts (see in particular the arguments found on pp. 197 et seq.). 
29 There is an 1873 decision in this sense (in “Monitore Giudiziario” 2 (1873), p. 272 
30 In virtue of a decision of 6 August 1872, Camillo and Beatrice, children of Angela 
Beretta, were declared by the Milan Court of Appeal natural children also of Carlo Pastore. 
This decision is recalled by Leoni, under Filiazione [n. 3], p. 263, and was quoted often in 
the decision of the Castiglione delle Stiviere Court which had intervened in the same case, 
about which immediately infra. 
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rights, from the moment that the 1865 Civil Code gave him a portion of the 
legitimate succession and a reserved portion of the testamentary 
succession31. All of this was based on the principle that “succession is 
regulated by the law obtaining at the time of the demise”32. 
It turned out that this very last point was to prove the most 
controversial and delicate. As a matter of fact, doctrinal positions ultimately 
agreed that for questions of status only the previous law had to be applied. 
Those born in Lombardy-Veneto were thus excluded from kinship ties, 
titles of nobility and the paternal surname. Successory rights were a much 
more delicate issue which touched upon the general principles of the legal 
system and as a consequence divided the approaches of magistrates and 
even professors. 
This was the climate of uncertainty in which a highly complex case 
began in March 1871 before the Court of Castiglione delle Stiviere, close to 
Mantua. It went on for many years, with appeals, counter appeals and 
applications made to the Court of Cassation, ending up attracting the 
attention of press and authors alike.  
The estate of the late Carlo Pastore was claimed by his brother, on 
the one hand, and his companion and her two children, on the other. The 
children had been formally acknowledged by the mother. With regard to 
their paternity, the deceased himself had expressly confirmed it in 
numerous letters and, above all, in a declaration of last will duly enrolled in 
the deeds of a notary. This testament had been considered sufficient to 
prove the paternity on the basis of Article 7 of the transitory provisions by 
both the local court and the Court of Appeal of Milan. 
____________________ 
31 The successions of natural children were regulated by the Code in Title II of Book Third, 
respectively in Chapter I, Section IV (Articles 743-752) and Chapter II, Section IV, §. II 
(Articles 815-820). The provisions lay down that in legitimate succession, natural children, 
whether acknowledged or declared (Article 743) received one moiety of the portion they 
would have received had they been legitimate (Article 744), acquiring a larger portion in 
the absence of legitimate children (Article 745) and being preferred even to collateral 
relatives (Article 747). The same proportions were to apply also in the case of 
testamentary succession (Articles 815-816).  
32 Leoni, under Filiazione [n. 3], pp. 263 et seq., refers to it polemically. Carlo Francesco 
Gabba, on the other hand, subscribes to it wholeheartedly, see infra, n. 50 et seq. and 
relative text. 
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In April 1871, the Court thus granted the two minor children, Camillo 
and Beatrice, the one-quarter share of their father’s estate. The decision 
carried a long rendering of reasons, recalling even the fundamental 
principles of the legal system and of the law of succession33. 
This decision, which for some jurists was criticisable and even 
absurd34, was not to remain isolated. Others followed in its steps, such as 
the decision delivered some months later, in September 1874, by the Court 
of Appeal of Venice, which cited exactly the same principles. 
The Court expressed itself thus:  
“the economy of the transitory provisions was meant to maintain 
undisturbed as much as possible the observance of the legal situation 
created and acquired by the law which was discontinued and to assimilate 
the effects of the new law which took its place” 
concluding that  
“equally, there can be no doubt that even offspring born and 
conceived before Unification are entitled judicially to seek the succession 
of their father according to the cases contemplated by the new Code, when 
the succession itself was opened under its regime”35. 
At the same time, the judges of the Brescia Court of Appeal went so 
far – albeit indirectly – as to acknowledge even children born of adultery, 
provided that they were born when the A. B. G. B. obtained. They even 
____________________ 
33 The very long decision delivered on 14 April 1874 by the Castiglione delle Stiviere Court 
was published in its entirety by  “Monitore dei Tribunali” 1874, pp. 969-977. 
34 It was criticised by, for instance, M. A. Salom, Sui diritti dei figli illegittimi nati e concepiti 
sotto l’impero del codice austriaco in relazione colle disposizioni transitorie per l’attuazione 
del codice civile italiano, in “Archivio Giuridico” 16 (1875), pp. 586-597. Leoni opposed it 
forcefully, under Filiazione [n. 3], p. 263. 
35 The reasons for the judgment were thus formulated: “because it is a basic legal principle 
that both manner and ability to succeed are measured in terms of the law which obtained 
at the time of the demise of the deceased who leaves the estate the inheritance of which 
is the subject-matter [of the action]; because the former too are to be deemed 
acknowledged children, and because if a different hypothesis were to be contemplated, in 
legitimate succession the former law should be followed even with regard to any other 
person who can be succeeded now finding themselves in a condition different to the 
previous one – which would be absurd”. Court of Appeal of Venice, decision of 22 
September 1874, in  “Monitore Giudiziario” 3 (1874), pp. 647-649.   
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granted the faculty to succeed, if these children were mentioned in a 
testament36. 
The approach which was taking form was however opposed by the 
judges partisans of legitimacy. The Supreme Court of Florence, in fact, 
overturned the Brescia decision. The Court of Cassation held that Article 6 
of the transitory provisions of the 1871 decree had only one objective, 
namely to ensure that 
“Article 189 would not have retroactive effects harming those born 
under a different legal regime. This objective would be defeated if they 
were allowed to submit proof in accordance with the former methods in 
order for them to accrue the highest possible benefit from the succession 
allowed by the new Code”.  
In such a way, actually, they would be “in a new position, quite 
exceptional and privileged, which would however have no basis in either 
the former nor the present law”37. 
Already the year before, in July 1874, the Court of Cassation of Turin 
had expressed itself in similar terms. Even if it had markedly different 
premises, the decision was clear and precise, and was widely known in 
legal circles and by authors38.  
According to the civil lawyers, the strongest interpretative argument 
used by the supreme judges of Turin to understand the meaning of the 
transitory provisions was found in the declarations made by the proposing 
Minister in his report to the King, namely: 
____________________ 
36 The decision of the Brescia Court of Appeal, which insists on the idea of a very marked 
position in favour of the child as the inspiring criterion of the transitory law, was published 
with ample excerpts by “Monitore dei Tribunali” 1873, pp. 149-150, where it is indicated 
as delivered in December 1872. Its contents were then summarised also on the Venice-
published “Monitore Giudiziario” 2 (1873), dated 6 August 1873. This is the same date 
Leoni cites under Filiazione [n. 3], p. 263. 
37 Court of Cassation of Florence, decided on 17 June 1875, in “Monitore Giudiziario” 4 
(1875), pp. 507-508. A favourable commentary had been published by the Venetian 
periodical in an issue of a few days before (cfr. c 4 (1875), p. 361). 
38 Court of Cassation of Turin, decided on 16 July 1874. It was transcribed by both 
“Monitore dei Tribunali”  (1874), pp. 920-922, (which carried it in its entirety, defining it as 
“one of the best-worded published during this year”), as well as “Annali della 
giurisprudenza italiana” 8 (1874), I, p. 430, with a synthesis of the legal bases. It received 
stout praise from Leoni, under Filiazione [n. 3], p. 264.  
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“it stands to reason that the proof of a fact which gives rise to rights 
and obligations falls under the law which governed that fact, thereby 
openly demonstrating that the reference to the previous law meant 
to indicate the legislation obtaining at the moment of the birth”39 
 
It followed, therefore, that this law was to be applied in its entirety 
and not only in its more favourable aspects. 
The search for the intention of the legislator through the preparatory 
works seemed, even to a significant number of authors, to be the best way 
to avoid misunderstandings caused by too literal an approach to the 
interpretation of the provisions. This had been where the former 
magistrates of Lombardy-Veneto had erred, when invoking a scrupulous 
observation of the dictates of the written rule40. 
In reality, as we shall presently see, not even this approach managed 
to cast away all doubts. 
According to a certain interpretation, thus, the minutes of the 
commissions charged with the drafting and correction of the draft code, in 
particular the minutes of the Coordinating Commission, would be a useful 
implement to clarify the objectives and limits of these norms.  
That group of eminent jurists and politicians had already dealt with 
family issues in the autumn of 1865. During the meeting of 5 October, the 
members of the Commission had discussed an amendment, proposed by 
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, according to which “the acquisition, the loss 
and the recovery of a civil or family status are regulated by the law which 
governed them at the time of the facts which caused them”. The rejection 
____________________ 
39 The decision reproduced in italics the words of the Minister (Court of Cassation of Turin, 
decision of 16 July 1874, in “Monitore dei Tribunali”  (1874), p. 921).  
40 Indeed, the Court of Appeal of Venice had declared, in good faith, to be desirous of 
observing the dictates of a law which provided debatable solutions. As a matter of fact, 
the Venetian magistrates wrote: “one could even question the intrinsic goodness of the 
measure at issue, but this lies completely outside the competence of the judge, whose 
duty is only to apply the law and not to review it. Whereas it cannot be doubted that 
for the aforesaid the favour of an exception was done so as not to harm those born 
and conceived before the coming into force of the new law, it is necessary to conclude 
that they too, given their relationship, have a character equivalent to the declaration”. 
Court of Appeal of Venice, decision of 22 September 1874, in  “Monitore Giudiziario” 3 
(1874), p. 648. 
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of this formulation was not due to any disagreement with its contents. It 
was actually rejected because it was deemed superfluous: “it enunciates a 
proposition which does not need to be enunciated”41. 
On the basis of this principle, then, if the declaration of natural 
filiation made according to the law obtaining at the time of the birth or 
conception, did not grant the child any family or successory rights, it was 
clear that “such rights could not be acquired by means of a subsequent 
law”42. 
The Turinese Supreme Court kept constantly to this line in its 
decisions during the following years43. But this confirmed the uncertainty 
still common among judges44 and others45. 
Between the end of 1879 and the beginning of 1880, Piedmontese 
magistrates proceeded to overturn certain decisions through which the 
Court of Appeal of Milan persisted in granting ample rights to natural 
children. Moreover, these magistrates felt it necessary to carry out a 
detailed comparison between the natural filiation regime provided for by 
Austrian law and the Italian Unification counterpart in order to bring to the 
____________________ 
41Verbali della Commissione di coordinamento, procès-verbale no. 67 – Hearing of 5 
October 1865, in Gianzana (ed.), Codice civile [n. 1], III, Verbali [n. 6], pp. 615-616. 
42 Leoni, under Filiazione [n. 3], p. 263. 
43 For example, the Turin Cassation’s decision of 16 December 1879 (published in both 
“Foro italiano” 1880, I,  p. 298, and “Il Filangieri” 1880, I. pp.  78-80) and the same Court’s 
decision of 5 February 1880, in “Annali” 14 (1880), I, 1, pp. 277-280. 
44 The approach of the Turin Cassation was not followed, say, by the Parma Court of 
Appeal, before which appeared the case decided on 16 December 1879 (see preceding 
note). Cfr. Parma Court of Appeal, decision of 30 April 1880, in “Annali” 14 (1880), III,  p. 
185. The Venice Court of Appeal tackled another aspect of the problem, relating to 
evidence, by applying the law obtaining at the time in which the proceedings had begun, 
not when the original fact had taken place (Court of Appeal of Venice, decision of 15 
October 1874, in “Annali” 8 (1874), II, pp. 319). Authors reacted very negatively to this 
decision (cfr. for example, F. Ricci, Corso teorico-pratico di diritto civile, I, Della 
pubblicazione ed interpretazione delle leggi e delle persone, Turin 1886, p. 206; Traina,  Il 
riconoscimento [n. 17], pp. 78-79; T. Cuturi, Studi sulla dichiarazione della paternità dei 
figli naturali, con particolare riferimento al diritto civile francese ed al diritto civile italiano, 
Perugia 1892, p. 102). 
45 A different approach was taken, for example, by the Cassation of Rome in its decision of 
5 January 1878, published in “Annali” 12 (1880), I, 1, pp. 122-123, praised by Carlo 
Francesco Gabba (see infra, n. 49 and relative text). 
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fore “the large difference in principles and objectives which inform the two 
legislations”. 
On the one hand, the former, they remarked, granted all illegitimate 
issue the right to seek “the authors of their days”, but it did so clearly “for 
the sole and clear purpose of obtaining from them alimony, education, and 
placement”. The latter, on the other hand, perceived these searches as 
“dangerous for the almost impossibility of obtaining proof”. It discouraged 
them but, if paternity was ascertained, “equate[d] declared issue to 
acknowledged issue”, defending their rights “in such a way as to conciliate 
the sentiments of humanity and civil progress with the respect due to the 
decorum and interest of the legitimate family”. 
These rights thus included “in addition to the right to alimony, the 
protection granted to the father, the right to carry his family name”. 
Furthermore, there was also “the significant part left to the acknowledged 
or declared natural issue in legitimate succession, and the reserved portion 
in testate succession”46. 
Thus, it followed that “when there is such disparity between the 
intrinsic characteristics and the legal consequences of the two declarations, 
granting to one the effects of the other would be tantamount manifestly to 
running counter to the will of both legislators”47. 
Only if the decision on paternity in terms of Articles 6 and 7 conserved 
the simple characteristics of the alimony action – some other eminent civil 
lawyers added – could the “indulgence on a large scale of the transitory 
law” be justified48. 
____________________ 
46 The first ruling, dated 16 December 1879 and published in “Foro italiano” 1880, I,  p. 
298 and in “Il Filangieri” 1880, I. pp.  78-80, is transcribed almost in full by Leoni, under 
Filiazione [n. 3], pp. 265-267, as a model for a correct reasoning; in similar fashion are the 
quotations taken from the Cassation of Turin, decision of 5 February 1880, in “Annali” 14 
(1880), I, 1, p. 279. 
47 “of the Austrian, who, while permitting the action for alimony, did not grant more rights 
than the Italian Code keeps for legally acknowledged or declared children – these rights 
the Austrian legislator actually expressly denies; of the Italian, who does not even allow 
the possibility of a judicial declaration save in the cases of abduction or carnal knowledge 
with violence”. Ibidem. 
48 See Cuturi, Studi sulla dichiarazione della paternità [n. 44], p.  106, supported by Leoni, 
under Filiazione [n. 3], p. 264. Equally explicit is the position taken by Salom, Sui diritti dei 
figli illegittimi [n. 34] and Carlo Francesco Gabba. 
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Nevertheless, when dealing with inheritances, solutions could never 
be easy. Indeed, according to many, this part of the law was regulated by 
principles which did not admit of exceptions, foremost among which the 
principle whereby successions were to be regulated by the law obtaining at 
the time of the demise of the deceased. This was emphatically affirmed by 
Carlo Francesco Gabba, who agreed with the Cassation of Rome that had 
followed this principle even in the case of citizens born before the 
unification of Italy49. 
On the basis of this fundamental rule of transitory law concerning 
successions, it followed, in the opinion of the author, that it was “beyond 
the shadow of a doubt” that the declared child  
 
“there being a preceding law, would have the same right to inherit 
that the Italian law grants to acknowledged children, where the 
succession of the parents, of the father in particular, is opened under 
the regime of this law”50. 
 
The solution therefore held also for the cases then being examined. 
It was true, as a matter of fact, remarked Gabba, that the Legislator, 
when calling back into effect “the provisions of the previous laws” did not 
specify if the intention was to call back “all kinds of law” or only those 
concerning matters similar to those treated by the discontinued rules. The 
author however indicated that Article 3 of the Patent of 6 December 1837 
for the implementation of the Albertine Civil Code, from which the 
transitory rule in question was copied, qualified the words “provisions of 
the preceding law” with the words “in this respect”. He argued that if that 
clause was not repeated in the Italian transitory law, it was only because 
____________________ 
49 In the opening part of his essay dedicated expressly to this subject, Gabba openly 
declared his preference for the solution embraced by the Cassation of Rome in its decision 
of 5 January 1878 (see supra, n. 45), according to which “successory rights of simply 
natural issue, declared as such in terms of Italian transitory civil law, must be regulated … 
according to Italian law” (C. F. Gabba, La successione ereditaria del figlio adulterino o 
incestuoso ai genitori suoi nel giure transitorio, in Id., Questioni di diritto civile, II, Diritto 
ereditario e Diritto delle obbligazioni, Milan-Turin-Rome 1911, pp. 7-13 ). 
50 Gabba, La successione ereditaria, p. 10. 
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“our legislator considered it superfluous for the purpose of rendering 
comprehensible such a clear thing”51. 
Though defended with authority, the favourable line of interpretation 
succeeded to sway neither authors nor Courts. From the 1880s onward, in 
fact, the Courts tended to toe the contrary line, both at first instance and at 
Cassation stage. The same applied for contributions by jurists of repute52. 
Natural children born in Lombardy-Veneto had by now to be content 
simply with alimony and could no longer reasonably hope for a sizeable 
portion of the estate. 
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